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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DOUBLE
INDEMNITY LAWt
JOHN G. KELLY
Double indemnity, in the sense here used, is the special benefit provision
of a life insurance policy under which double the face amount of the insur-
ance is payable in stated circumstances. It is in a broad sense the equivalent
of the accidental death coverage in an accident and health policy. Allowing,
of course, for the variations in the language of individual policies, the cir-
cumstances under which double indemnity is payable are in general upon
proof that the insured's death resulted directly from bodily injury caused
solely by external, violent and accidental means and was not due directly
or indirectly to disease or bodily or mental infirmity. Payment of this special
benefit is usually subject also to certain additional limitations: That death
occur before a certain age, e.g., 65, or in some cases 60, and that it occur
within a specified number of days after the accidental injury, e.g., 60 or 90
days. Certain specific exclusions from coverage are customary. Among these
are deaths due to suicide, war, military or naval service in time of war, and
certain aviation deaths. This special benefit is usually provided at a preinium
rate graded by age and ranging from approximately $1.00 to $2.00 per $1,000
of insurance.
Double indemnity is a desirable supplement to the primary life insurance.
It is intended to provide double payment to the beneficiary at the time of
greatest need when the insured meets an untimely and premature death as
the result of accidental injury.
A discussion of the legal phase of double indemnity might not appear in
proper focus unless projected against a background of the total picture of
double indemnity. Inquiry as to the 1946 experience of a group of repre-
sentative life insurance companies disclosed that in that year these com-
panies considered claims for double indemnity in total amount of $17,241,259;
they paid such claims in the amount of $14,930,352. Under those claims
which were declined as not within the coverage, suit to compel payment
had been brought in cases involving $445,321, or 2.5% of the total amount
on which action had been taken. It is, of course, recognized that the latter
tA paper delivered at the Health, Accident and Life Insurance Law Round Table
of the Insurance Section of the American Bar Association 70th Annual Meeting held
at Cleveland, Ohio in September, 1947. A compilation of the leading American double
indemnity and related cases of the period covering the years 1942 to 1947 appears in an
appendix to this article. [Ed.]
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figure is not a final one, since in some instances, suit may be instituted at
a later date. However, these figures are deserving of note at this point lest
our consideration of recent developments in double indemnity law appear
to give an exaggerated impression of the relation of litigated cases to the
total picture.
A fairly common factual situation which has served as a basis for a
double indemnity claim is this:
A person of advanced years (upwards of 60 years of age) falls to the
floor and sustains a fractured hip. Death follows within a few days or weeks
thereafter. There is evidence of prior serious physical impairment extending
over a period of years including difficulty in locomotion. There is no wit-
ness to the fatal fall and no direct evidence of its nature.
Under such circumstances, has the beneficiary sustained her burden of
proof and established that death was due to injuries received solely from
external, violent and accidental means and not directly or indirectly to disease
or bodily infirmity? Some Courts have said "No". 1 The Supreme Court of
Indiana and the Supreme Court of Oregon stated that in the absence of any
evidence that the insured had slipped or stumbled and in the light of the
prior physical impairments affecting locomotion, it would be pure speculation
to permit a choice between the equally probable alternatives of a fall caused
by the insured's physical impairments and a fall unrelated to them. Both
Courts agreed that under such circumstances a decision cannot be predi-
cated upon a mere presumption or assumption that because there was a fall,
the fall was an accident.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals took a different view.2 In the Missouri
case, the insured was 69 years of age. There was a history of progressive
lateral sclerosis of the spine causing difficulty in locomotion for more than
a year prior to his death. This history included a hospital record (dated
over a year prior to the death), reading in part:
has had progressive symptoms in legs and back of very vague
nature. He states that he has a painful back and great difficulty in
walking and a slight degree of nervousness. He states that if he looks
down while walking, he tends to fall forward; if while sitting he looks
up, he becomes dizzy.... Cannot step off curbstone for fear of falling."' 3
On the day the insured received his fatal injuries he was alone in the bed-
lPrudential Ins. Co. v. Van Wey, 223 Ind. 198, 59 N. E. 2d 721 (1945) ; Seater v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 176 Ore. 542, 156 P. 2d 386 (1945), rehearing, 176 Ore. 542,
159 P. 2d 826 (1945).2Beimdiek v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 S. W. 2d 379 (Mo. App. 1944).
Uid. at 381.
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room of his apartment. When his wife called him to dinner she heard a
thud. On going to his room she found him sitting on the floor. In answer to
her inquiry, he said he had tried to grab the footboard of the bed and had
missed it. He died of terminal pneumonia following confinement to bed as
the result of a fracture of the hip sustained in the fall.
In affirming judgment for the beneficiary, the Court stated that: "In the
opinion of the writer it would be difficult to visualize more convincing cir-
cumstantial proof of an accidental fall of the insured than that presented by
the record in this case." The Court conceded that no one saw the insured
fall, and that other than the statement of the insured that he attempted to
grab the footboard of the bed and missed, the question must be answered
from the circumstances proved and the inferences therefrom. It added, how-
ever, that in cases such as this "... there is a well established .presumption
of law that the injured person did not voluntarily inflict the injury upon
himself and that the injury was due to an accident". 4
Another case in which the Court found the inference of accidental injury
to be stronger than that of death due directly or indirectly to disease, in-
volved a young man 31 years of age who sustained fatal injuries when the
automobile he was driving left the road, crashed into a tree, plowed through
a field, jumped a railroad track, and ended up in a rock pit of water 20 feet
deep.5 On the insured's body when removed from the car, was a card bear-
ing his name and the notation: "Subject to convulsions; in case of an attack,
no doctor needed. Let me stay quietly until I awake naturally."
There was a prior seven-year history of convulsions and periods of un-
consciousness. The day on which the accident occurred was clear; there
were no obstructions on the highway, nor were there any skid marks, broken
glass or other indications that the brakes had been suddenly applied or fhat
the auto had collided with another object.
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the plaintiff had sustained the
burden of proof on the ground that where death by external and violent
means is established, a presumption is thereby created or prima facie proof
is thereby made that death was likewise by accidental means. It stated that
unless there are facts and circumstances shown which established the con-
trary, the one who has the burden of proving death by accidental means
will be entitled to recover.
Another factual situation involving pre-existing disease and a so-called
accident is found in those cases in which some exertion of the insured precipi-
41d. at 382.5Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 153 Fla. 53, 13 So. 2d 610 (1943).
[Vol. 33
DOUBLE INDEMNITY
tates a fatal heart attack. A 61-year old man suffered a coronary thrombosis
and died shortly after having pushed his automobile a distance of 50 feet.
The autopsy established extensive and long-standing sclerosis of the coronary
artery with narrowing of the lumen. Medical testimony was to the effect
that any exertion which would cause a rise of blood pressure could have
precipitated the coronary occlusion. In denying that double indemnity under
two life insurance policies and the death benefit under a policy of accident
insurance were payable, the Supreme Court of Washington made a most
exhaustive review of the authorities on the question of accidental means
versus accidental result, and concluded that the policies required (as stated
by their terms) proof of injury sustained through accidental means; that
accidental means were never present when a deliberate act is performed un-
less some additional unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening
occurs which produces or-brings about the injury, and that the result of any
act cannot be considered in the determination of the question of whether
there is an accident.6 The Court indicated that other Courts which have
adopted the accidental result test have erroneously based their holding on a
partial quotation from the rule laid down in United States Mutual Acc. Assn.
v. Barry,7 and rejected such decisions as not conforming to the weight of
opinion. Finally, it rejected the "proximate cause" test as having no applica-
tion in ascertaining liability under policy provisions of this type, and held that
the beneficiary may not recover unless able to show that the death was
caused solely by accidental means.
The New York Court of Appeals reached an opposite result in the case
of a coronary death following over-exertion, although under more dramatic
circumstances.
8
The insured's automobile was forced off the road into a ditch after being
struck by a truck during a snowstorm. After trudging through the snow
to a nearby farmhouse to obtain a shovel, the insured returned to his car
and complained that the wind had knocked him out. After sitting in the
car for about 20 minutes, he left it and began to shovel the snow away.
His wife opened the door of the car and saw him hit himself or slip or fall
against the shovel or against the rear of the car. She jumped out and helped
him into the car where he sat down for a moment and died. The trial court
charged the jury that if they found that death was the result of over-exposure
or over-exertion or by slipping and falling against the shovel and the car,
6Evans v. Metropolitan Life ins. Co., - Wash. -, 174 P. 2d 961 (1947).
7131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755 (1889).8Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Assn., 295 N. Y. 294, 67 N. E. 2d 248
(1946).
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or by a combination of these, and if they further found that the insured
could not have been reasonably expected to anticipate such results from his
action, then they might find that the essential accidental means existed.
The court accepted this charge as correct, pointing out that New York
no longer recognizes any distinction between accidental death and death
by accidental means, nor between accidental means and accidental result.
It concerned itself somewhat with the question of whether any over-exertion
might provide the basis for a claim of accidental death. It indicated that
this would not be so, citing earlier New York cases in which recovery was
denied where the act of over-exertion was a natural and customary act of
a householder or a workman. It expressed the view that the trial court's
use of the word over-exertion in its charge must have been understood by
the court and jury not in the conventional sense but rather in the light of
the fact that the chain of causation in the case at bar was set in motion
beginning with the automobile accident in the course of driving during a
heavy snowstorm, followed by an emergency resulting from being stalled
in the snow at a time when it was necessary for the insured to take the action
he did to protect his family. So far as concerned the question of contribu-
tory disease, the court held that this presented a question of fact for the
jury in the light of the conflict between plaintiff's evidence of prior good
health of the insured and autopsy findings regarding the heart and arteries.
It referred to the fact that there was opinion evidence that these findings
did not portray and could not correctly have portrayed the actual condition
of the coronary arteries of the insured when he was alive on the day he died.
A third factual situation involving a combination of existing disease and
so-called accident is found in cases where a death follows a major surgical
operation necessitated by existing disease. In a case arising under a policy
of accident insurance, 9 the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit
held that such a death was not the result of bodily injury effected solely
through accidental means. The insured, age 62, submitted to an operation
necessitated by chronic infection of the gall bladder. Twenty-four hours
after the operation he died of a pulmonary collapse. The evidence estab-
lished that a pulmonary collapse is not to be expected as a natural and
probable consequence of an operation but that it does occur sometimes
following a major abdominal operation. The court held that even under
the New York rule (not recognizing the distinction between accidental means
and accidental result) which was applicable to the contract before it, there
could be no recovery of the accidental death benefit in a case such as this.
9Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 F. 2d 165 (C. C. A. 10th 1944).
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It relied on a decision of a New York intermediate appellate court' ° as
supporting the view that, despite the general holding of the New York courts
that accidental result and accidental means are synonymous, they make a
distinction between an unforeseen and unexpected result arising from a trivial
cause and a post-operative death in which, although the eventuality of the
death may be rare, it is recognized as possible and the cause is not trivial.
The court concluded that, where, as here, the 62-year old insured was suf-
fering from a chronic gall bladder ailment, his appendix was seriously in-
volved and he was also suffering from degeneration of the liver and kidneys,
thereby necessitating a major operation in the upper abdomen which caused
a pulmonary collapse, the ordinary man would not regard the death as
accidental.
Opposed to the view of the case is that of the Utah Supreme Court in
a case involving death from a pulmonary embolism following an operation.'1
It was conceded that there was no slip or mishap in the course of the opera-
tion. However, the court upheld recovery under the Utah rule that the
coverage extended to cases where the death was an unexpected result of
an intended act.
Determination of the effect of the "visible contusion or wound" limitation
in the double indemnity provision shows a similar divergence of opinion
among courts.
In one case the insured was travelling hand over hand suspended from a
wire stretched between two masts of a pleasure yacht.' 2 Reaching for the
wire with one hand he lost his grip so that his body swung around and he
held on by the other hand. He then returned to the mast and remained
there a few minutes, after which he descended to the deck. From that time
until his death (three. weeks later) he complained intermittently of pains
in the chest, on exertion he perspired freely, his face became pale, and his
lips were sometimes blue. His death was attributed to coronary thrombosis.
Although, assuming as correct the beneficiary's contention that the hap-
penings on the yacht accidentally caused the coronary thrombosis, the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, reversed a judgment in her favor on
the ground of an absence of proof that the accidental injury was evidenced by
a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body. The court said
there was no evidence of any wound. In holding that the pallor or blueness
'OBennet v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 13 N. Y. S. 2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 261
App. Div. 819, 25 N. Y. S. 2d (1st Dep't 1941).
"1Handley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 106 Utah 184, 147 P. 2d 319 (1944).
12Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Pistolesi, 160 F. 2d 668 (C. C. A. 9th '1947), cert.
-, U .S. -, - Sup. Ct. - (194-).
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of the lips did not constitute a contusion, the court pointed out that the
California Civil Code provides that the words of the contract are to be under-
stood in their ordinary and popular sense, and that insurance policies are
so construed. It accepted the dictionary definition of a contusion as a "bruise
and injury attended with a more or less disorganization of the subcutaneous
tissue and effusion of blood beneath the skin without breaking the skin".
It concluded that this definition corresponded to the uncontradicted medical
testimony in the case.
The preceding case cited with approval an earlier federal court decision
involving a sunstroke death under a policy requiring that the accidental
injury be evidenced by a visible contusion or wound. 3 In the earlier case,
in holding that pallor, perspiration, dilated pupils, or bluish tint to the
skin could not be regarded as either wounds or contusions, the court leferred
to the commonly accepted meaning of the policy language and stated that
where language is clear and unambiguous and has a well-defined meaning,
the presumption must be that the parties used such words in their ordinary
and well-understood meaning, concluding:
"Courts are not justified in adopting strange or technical or unnatural
definitions of words in order to swing the pendulum one way or the
other."' 4
The pendulum was swung the other way in a Texas case. 15 Here, also,
the insured's death was due to sunstroke. The double indemnity provision
required that the accidental injury be evidenced by a visible contusion or
wound on the exterior of the body. The court conceded that what it called
"technically speaking", a contusion is a bruise or damage which does not
break the skin and a wound involves a breaking of the skin. However, in
the light of, various Texas decisions holding that heatstroke may be an
accidental death, the court held that the words "contusion or wound" as
applied to a heatstroke case must mean the kind of external evidence that
would be produced by a heatstroke, rather than a bruise or open wound.
It might be noted that in the preceding case, which reached an opposite
result, the federal court was likewise faced with the fact that under the law
of the State of the contract, sunstroke is regarded as an accident effected
solely through external, violent, and accidental means, but took the position
that it had to face the further and separate question of whether such accident
13Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Stanfield, 151 F. 2d 776 (C. C. A. 10th 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U. S. 795, 66 Sup. Ct. 825 (1946).
141d. at 177.
15 Amnerican Nat. Ins. Co. v. Fox, 184 S. W. 2d 937 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
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was within the coverage of the policy language requiring that the injury be
evidenced by a visible contusion or wound.
It may fairly be said that these cases illustrate a tendency on the part of
some courts to reach an unrealistic and extreme conclusion as to the effect
of the accidental death benefit provision on rather tenuous legal grounds,
thereby extending the coverage beyond that contractually provided. Other
courts, as indicated, have taken an opposing view.
The first tendency is exemplified by those cases permitting recovery on
the basis of a presumption of accidental means where there is proof only
that the injuries followed an apparent accident of some kind, despite evidence
of preexisting disease which in all human probability was a cause or sub-
stantially contributed to the fatal injuries. The question of whether such
a presumption should be applied under these circumstances was squarely
presented to the Oregon Supreme Court on a motion for reargument of
the case previously referred to where recovery had been denied under such
circumstances. 16 Rejecting the contention that there was a presumption
that the means of death were accidental, the court indicated that the so-called
presumption resulted from a misapplication of the presumption against
suicide. The court said that if there is such a presumption it could be prop-
erly applicable only in cases where the issue was whether the injuries were
accidental or self-inflicted but that it was inapplicable where the issue was
whether a fall was caused by accident or preexisting disease. Assuming,
without deciding, that there might be a case in which evidence of death
from external violence without more might permit an inference that the
fatal injury was the result of accidental means, the court stated that such
was not the case where evidence indicated probability of a fall caused by
mental or physical impairments.
Permitting recovery of the accidental death benefit where over-exertion
causes a coronary death is another example of an extreme interpretation of
the policy provisions and an extension of the coverage. A realistic appraisal
might lead one to question whether a man who is not suffering from exist-
ing heart disease could ever sustain a fatal coronary attack through over-
exertion. However, this is usually a question of fact for the jury. So far
as concerns the applicable rules of law, it is interesting to note that the
New York Court of Appeals found no error in a trial court's charge that
if the jury found that the insured died as a result of over-exertion, they
might find that the essential accidental means existed. It is important to
16Seater v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 Ore. 542, 156 P. 2d 386 (1945), rehearing,
176 Ore. 542, 159 P. 2d 826 (1945).
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note, however, that in approving this charge the Court of Appeals attempted
to limit the effect of its decision to cases in which the "over-exerti6n" oc-
curred in the course of accidental occurrences. The court apparently re-
affirmed its earlier holdings that the "conventional" over-exertion death
(e.g., in the course of an act which was the natural and customary act of
a householder in or about his house, or of a workman within the scope of
his duties) would not be the result of accidental means.
Whether the limiting language of the court will in the future be sufficient
to prevent expansion of the "over-exertion" rule and an opening of the door
to numerous claims for double indemnity in which a person with serious
heart trouble happens to have exerted himself shortly before the fatal inci-
dent, is problematical. In a subsequent lower court New York case 7 in-
volving a claim for disability benefits under an accident policy, it was held
that the act of sandpapering the panel of a bathroom was not a natural and
customary act of the insured in and about his house and that, the resulting
coronary insufficiency was sustained through accidental means, i.e., by ex-
penditure of unusual exertion in the course of other than a natural and
customary act resulting in an unforseeable and not natural or probable
consequence. This decision appears to have applied the language, but not
the spirit or intent of the Court of Appeals' opinion in the Burr case.
A third example of an unrealistic .extension of the coverage is seen in
those cases where death followed a major operation which was performed
without slip or mishap and which was .occasioned by existing disease. In
permitting recovery for a post-operative death, the Chief Justice of the Utah
Supreme Court writing for the majority of the court used these thought-
provoking words:
".. . the words of the provision under discussion when accurately read
can mean only that the accident-external and violent-must precede
and produce the injury which must in t.urn precede and produce death.
In spite of this plain, clear meaning of the words, courts manned by
able and understanding judges, have construed the passage to cover
situations where the means or cause was not accidental although violent
and external and the results were accidental in the sense that they were
not contemplated or expected .... It is to be granted that a contract in
case of ambiguity must be construed against the party who drew it and
especially is this so in the case of contracts which are sold widely to
the average man under sales talk which cannot be too technical in its
expositions and yet which very easily lull him into a belief that he has
purchased certain benefits which on closer scrutiny of the contract are
17Joseph v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., American Life Convention Legal Bulletin, Feb.,
1947, p. 39.
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asserted not to be included. But the writer has some doubt as to whether
the construction or provisions like the one under discussion have not
been liberalized beyond the point justified by a supposed ambiguity or
by the principle that the burden is on the draftsman of the contract.
The phrases seem to be accurately expressed.' 8
.In concluding its opinion, the court stated that it had been urged that
upholding recovery in such cases opens up the question whether any and
every unexpected result of technically correct operation is not an accident
and commented "perhaps so".
Other doubts have been expressed regarding extreme interpretations
which some Courts have placed on the policy provisions. In an article in
the Rocky Mountain Law Review of December 1946 regarding the manner
in which Courts have interpreted the gas exclusion, the author states:
"It seems that the desire of the courts to construe the wording of an
insurance policy most strongly against the insurer has been carried to
an illogical extreme, and that future decisions would do well to take
the words of an insurance policy at their face value as do the parties
themselves."' 9
In a recent case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, refer-
ring to the words in the double indemnity provision which required that
bodily injury be effected solely through external, violent and accidental
means and that it not result directly or indirectly from bodily or mental
infirmity or disease of any sort, said:
"These words cannot be thrown away. They limit the coverage of the
insurance. A court can no more extend the coverage than it can increase
the amount of the insurance. Deliberately to do either would be a sort
of judicial larceny."'20
In a recent case involving a claim for disability benefits, the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington said:
"The importance of the matter far transcends the instant case; for it
has long been settled by both statute and case law that the insurance
business is affected with a public interest. The payment of unjust claims
by an insurance company is a detriment to the public whether made by
mutual companies or stock companies; for, in the long run, the amount
of losses which insurance companies are compelled to pay must deter-
mine the premium rates which the public must pay for insurance
protection."'2
1
'
8Handley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 106 Utah 184, -, 147 P. 2d 319, - (1944).
19Goodwin, The Exceptiom in Insurance Policies of "Inhaling Gas", 19 ROCKY MT.
L. REv. 84, 86 (1946).20Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hess, 161 F. 2d 1, 4 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
21Kuhnle v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 20 Wash. 2d 255, 260, 147 P. 2d
281, 284 (1944).
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This quotation aptly emphasizes the social nature of insurance and is
equally applicable to any extension of the coverage by judicial fiat. The
consequences of an unreasonable extension of the disability benefit coverage
by judicial interpretation are of too recent memory for anyone to contem-
plate with complacency the possibility that at some future date unrealistic
and unreasonable application of the terms of the double indemnity provision
(resulting in the payment of losses beyond those provided for) may deprive
the insuring public as a whole of this most desirable supplement to the
principal coverage of their life insurance. The question naturally, arises-
can any language be devised to define the coverage that will not yield to the
persistent erosion of the Courts?
In any event, it seems appropriate that counsel representing a defendant
insurer in litigation involving an attempt to fasten an unrealistic interpreta-
tion on the double indemnity coverage, in addition to pointing out the legal
weaknesses of the contention advanced, should also emphasize to the Court
that "the importance of the matter far transcends the instant case" and that
permitting a litigating claimant to establish an unwarranted liability by a
tortured construction of the policy provisions is an ultimate detriment to
the insuring public as a whole. Counsel for beneficiaries must at least
wrestle with their social consciences in some of the cases with which they
may be presented. In the final analysis the answer rests with the bench
which must settle the conflicting claims of the individual litigant and the
great body of policyholders who must assume the ultimate cost, and who,
'it should always be remembered, are also entitled to the protection of the
courts.
APPENDIX: DOUBLE INDEMNITY CASES
Alabama:
White v. New York Life Ins. Co., 145 :. 2d 504, 10 CCH LIFE CASES 274 (C. C. A.
5th 1944).
Arizona:
Greber v. New York Life Ins. Co., 61 Ariz. 341, 149 P. 2d 671, 9 CCH LIFE CASES
1095 (1944).
Arkansas:
Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Sims, 208 Ark. 1069, 189 S. W. 2d 193, 10 CCH LiFE
CASES 1065 (1945).
California:
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Pistolesi, 160 F. 2d 668, 12 CCH LIFE CASES 389
(C. C. A. 9th 1947); Glaeser v. Prudential Ins. Co., 57 F. Supp. 198, 10 CCH LIFE
CASES 172 (N, D. Cal. 1944) ; Rooney v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Assn., 74 Cal.
App. 2d 885, 170 P. 2d 72, 11 CCH LiFz CASES 946 (1946) ; Christen v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 10 CCH LIFE CASES 991 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1945).
District of Columbia:
Railway Mail Assn. v. Stauffer, 152 F. 2d 146, 11 CCH LIFE CASES 287 (App. D. C.,
1945).
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Florida:
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hess, 161 F. 2d 1, 12 CCH LIFE CASES 477 (C. C. A. 5th
1947) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 153 Fla. 53, 13 So. 2d 610, 8 CCH LiFE
CASES 417 (1943).
Georgia:
McLendon v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 557, 31 S. E. 2d 429, 10 CCH LiFE
CASES 145 (1944).
Idaho:
O'Neil v. New York Life Ins. Co., 65 Idaho 722, 152 P. 2d 707, 10 CCH LIFE CASES
238 (1944).
Illilwis:
Contois v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 156 F. 2d 44, 11 CCH LIFE CASES 729 (C. C. A.
7th 1946); Powell Bros., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 318
Ill. App. 643, 48 N. E. 2d 206, 8 CCH LIFE CASES 752 (1943) ; Teutrine v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 331 Ill. App. 107, 72 N. E. 2d 444, 12 CCH LIFE CASES 461 (1947).
Indiana:
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Van Wey, 223 Ind. 198, 59 N. E. 2d 721, 10 CCH LIFE CASES
730 (1945).
Kansas:
Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 F. 2d 165, 10 CCH LIFE CASES 61 (C. C. A.
10th 1944).
Kenttwky:
Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Webber, 299 Ky. 846, 187 S. W. 2d 273,
10 CCH LIFE CASES 652 (1945).
Louisiana:
Toups v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 49 F. Supp. 348, 8 CCH LIFE CASES 973
(E. D. La., 1943); Lipscomb v. Equitable Life, 205 La. 738, 18 So. 2d 167, CCH
LIFE CASES 898 (1944); Siracusa v. Prudential Ins. Co., 12 CCH LIFE CASES 572
(La. Sup. Ct. May 26, 1946).
Maryland:
Levinson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 41 A. 2d 485, 10 CCH LIFE CASES 767 (Md. Ct. App.,
1945); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Plummer, 28 A. 2d 856, 7 CCH LIFE CASES
1107 (Md. Ct. App., 1942).
Massachusetts:
McHugh v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 317 Mass. 498, 58 N. E. 2d 843,
10 CCH LIFE CASES 484 (1945) ; Howe v. National Life Ins. Co., - Mass. -, 72
N. E. 2d 425, 12 CCH LIFE CASES 484 (1947).
Michigam:
Ruona v. New York Life Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 923, 12 CCH LIFE CASES 172 (W. D.
Mich. 1946) ; Koycheff v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Assn., 305 Mich. 660, 9 N. W.
2d 883, 8 CCH LIFE CASES 841 (1943); McKenna v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314
Mich. 304, 22 N. W. 2d 376, 11 CCH LIFE CASES 587 (1946) ; Hooper v. State Mut.
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CASES 144 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; McNamara v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 134 N. J. L. 231,
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67 N. E. 2d 248, 11 CCH LIFE CASES 742 (1946) ; Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
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Utah:
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